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Some Recent Kentucky Tax Cases
Of Economic Significance
By JAMES

W. MARTIN*

Numerous tax decisions by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
since midcentury have comparatively little meaning beyond the
scope of the issues immediately concerned in the litigation. A few
cases have significance far beyond the scope of the subject matter
directly in controversy. This brief paper is designed to analyze
some economic implications which follow from the three recent
decisions that appear to embody legal changes affecting economic
relationships. The three cases are otherwise unrelated.
Of the three cases, one appears to constitute an impediment to
economic growth. Both the others have the long-range effect of
removing earlier judicially-imposed interference with the progress
of the economy. The arrangement of the paper is based on this
classification of the cases, the economically constructive ones being
given the place of major emphasis at the end of the paper.
I
The Kentucky income tax statute1 prior to 1954 provided in
general for deduction of federal income tax in computing the
income for state taxation. It also reflected an over-all effort to
define a uniform income base for the computation of each taxpayer's liability. There is even included a provision relating to
the Kentucky taxpayer's accounting practice to the effect that,
"if the method employed does not clearly reflect the true income
of the taxpayer, the computation shall be made upon the basis and
in the manner that in the opinion of the Department of Revenue
clearly reflects the true income." 2 The same legislative purpose is
* Director Bureau Research, College of Commerce, University of Kentucky;
former Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue and consultant on taxation to cities,
counties, corporations, states, and national governments. (Professor Martin is an
economist, not an attorney; here he considers the economic implications independently of the legal merits of the cases examined.)
I Ky. REv. STAT. secs. 141.010 et seq. The Department of Revenue has also
reprinted the text in INco~M TAx LAw AND REcULAIONS.
' Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 141.040.
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again reflected 3 in a provision of Kentucky Revised Statutes section
141.120 reading as follows:
In the event the formula for allocating income prescribed herein, as applied in a particular case, reaches an
unconstitutional result, or the department determines that
said formula as applied in a particular case fails to allocate
to Kentucky a fair and reasonable portion of business income, the department shall prescribe a formula which allocates to Kentucky a fair and reasonable portion of the busi4
ness income.
In the case of Clayton and Lambert Manufacturing Co. Inc. v.
Kentucky State Tax Commission et al.,5 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was confronted with a specific problem involving the construction of these provisions. The facts may be summarized briefly.
The manufacturing company, a Delaware corporation, maintained
its principal place of business in Louisville; but in 1946 it sold a
valuable property in Michigan on which it made a substantial
capital gain. The case before the court sought to determine
whether the federal tax paid on the capital gain was or was not
deductible in computing the base of the Kentucky income tax.
The court held that that tax constituted a deductible item.
The practical economic result of this ruling is to render the
discriminatory effect of the deduction of federal income tax (in
conjunction with the apparently inevitable differences between
federal and state coverage) even more pronounced than it would
be without this construction. Let us assume that the taxpayer's
capital gain is $256,000 on which the federal tax is $64,000. Suppose the income from operations, all in Kentucky, amounted to
$75,000 after all deductions except the federal capital gains tax.
Under these conditions, the corporate income taxable in Kentucky would be $11,000, which at 4 per cent would mean a tax
payment of $440. A competitor, conducting the same kind of
business and enjoying identical Kentucky income, would in the
absence of any irrelevant Michigan transaction be required to pay
' In a relationship only generally relevant to the present discussion.

Ky. IBxv. STAT. sec. 141.120(2).
5 265 S.W. 2d 449.
' That the inadvertent discriminations without this one are substantial and
varied has been demonstrated elsewhere. Lockyer and Martin, Some Kentucky Income Tax Discriminations,89 Ky. L.J. 377 (1951).
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on $75,000 resulting in a tax of $3,000. This competitor must pay
nearly seven times as much income tax on the identical amount
of income derived from the same sort of Kentucky source. Is this
discrimination just? Is such an application of the statute, as con7
strued, even consistent with the Kentucky constitution?
If the discriminatory effect of the decision-probably operative
as to fairly numerous taxpayers-is apparent, it remains only to
add as to this case that the General Assembly hastened to revise
the earlier language of the statute."
II
In Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel and TransportationCo.,9 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held liable for ad valorem property
tax a Maine corporation, having its principal place of business in
West Virginia and engaging in contract transportation for its
parent on the Ohio River between Huntington, West Virginia,
and Cincinnati, Ohio. The Corporation operated mooring facilities in Campbell County, Kentucky. The court ruled that the
property of the transportation company was subject to Kentucky's
taxing jurisdiction and was properly apportioned to the state on
the basis of a mileage prorate. The doctrine of the Island Creek
case appears to eventuate inevitably from the concept of jurisdiction developed in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.10
The practical results of the earlier view of the courts,". which
in Kentucky had been extended 12 beyond the bounds established
by the United States Supreme Court or, as far as the writer has
discovered, by the supreme court of any state other than Kentucky,
has been largely, in effect, to exempt the vessels of transportation
This last query is of only incidental significance for the purposes of this
paper. It is raised because of the legal concept of statutory construction which
makes it the court's duty to construe an ambiguous statute, if possible, in such a
manner that the statute will be constitutional.
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 141.010 (8). There is a typographical error in the citation in Allphin, 1954 Kentucky Tax Legislation, 43 Ky. L.J. 76 at 80 (1954).
313 Ky. 400, 230 S.W. 2d 924 (1950).
20336 U.S. 169, 69 S. Ct. 482, 93 Law Ed. 585 (1949).

' Especially as expressed authoritatively in such cases as Old Dominion S. S.
Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 S. Ct. 686, 49 Law Ed. 1059 (1905), and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 32 S. Ct. 13, 56 L. Ed. 96 (1911).
The now obsolete view appeared to be given further application in Northwest
Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed. 1283 (1944).
'IIn Reeves, Com'r et al. v. Service Lines, Inc. 291 Ky. 410, 164 S.W. 2d
593 (1942).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

companies from ad valorem taxation. This result was accomplished by the rule that only the state of domicile could tax vessels
used interstate and by the resulting practice of chartering water
transportation corporations only-or almost so-in the few states
which did not have a tax on such property. However, this freedom
from property taxation did not apply in the same degree to ferries
3
and sometimes to other localized water transportation holdings.'
The Island Creek case 4 effects a substantial change in the distribution of the incidence of state and local carrier taxes. On such
businesses in the aggregate, the ad valorem property tax constitutes
a heavy proportion of the total state and local tax load. Prior
to 1950, it is practically correct to say that ferries and land, air,
and rail transportation properties paid the property tax bill, and
owners of vessels engaged in other water transportation paid none.
The net effect of 1950 decision will be largely to distribute the ad
valorem tax load according to the relative values of the properties
employed in carrier businesses.
The absolute amount of tax payments involved in the litigation, either directly or as a result of action subsequently taken in
compliance with the court's decision, is not great. The volume of
river transportation in Kentucky waters is not sufficient to require
the use of heavy investment in barges and other vessels. Thus, the
economic consequences in terms of the amount of public revenues
are less significant than in terms of the distribution of the transportation tax load.
III
In Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Reeves,' 5 the Kentucky Court of Appeals took a major step toward making possible
refined property appraisals for tax purposes. In so doing, the court
& 6 which had resulted in
overruled a series of Kentucky cases
somewhat of a strait jacket for valuation officials.
Perhaps the best study of the legal and economic aspects of these issues is
found in the authoritative United States Board of Investigation and Research
(Transportation Act of 1940), CAruua TAXATION 259-312, 349-895.
' It appears that another Kentucky case is now pending to ascertain whether,
under the doctrine, newly applied to water transportation, vessels conducting
business in the same Kentucky stream but not maintaining any physical contact
with the shore of Kentucky are subject to the state's taxing jurisdiction. The result of this litigation may conceivably modify the textual statement of the economic
consequences of the Island Creek case.
"259 S.W. 2d 432 (1953).
" Notably Bingham's Adm'r et al. v. Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Bing-
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The basic Kentucky problem in modern tax valuations has
stemmed from the Court of Appeals decision in the Bingham case
There the problem was similar to that submitted in the Citizens
Fidelity case. Mrs. Bingham's estate included, among other properties, 16,400 shares of Standard Oil of New Jersey common stock.
The personal representative introduced evidence that the sale of
such a large block of stock would have depressed the market so
that the fair market value per share of the property to be appraised would not have been the same as, but considerably less
than, the market quotations on the sale of the few hundred shares
actually involved in the transactions near the date of Mrs. Bingham's death. Although seeming to admit the appraisal facts urged
by the administrator, 17 the court held as a matter of law that the
property must be valued for taxation at the figure fixed by sales of
small lots of the stock on or about the date as of which the property was to be appraised.
To an appraiser, the Bingham case introduced three sorts of
impediments to accurate valuation even though obviously in most
instances no error results from the direct employment of market
quotations. In the first place, the case, more because of the opinion than of the decision, appeared to require a rigidity of conception
not consistent with the economics of appraisal. In this view, the
court was in a measure supported by earlier rulings.' 8 Competent
appraisers know that, if a property is sold, there is no assurance
that the price fixed by the sale would be the same as that which
would be fixed by another sale the same day. That is, the fair
market value of a property to an appraiser is not a metaphysical
entity or a rigidly fixed amount. Rather, it is the value which is
most likely to be arrived at in a free market in which buyers and
sellers have the degree of information about the property that
parties to a transaction normally have. 9 To the appraiser, the
ham's Adm'r et al., 196 Ky. 318, 244 S.W. 781 (1922) and Board of Sup'rs of
City of Frankfort et al. v. State National Bank of Frankfort, 800 Ky. 620, 189 S.W.
2d 942
7 (1945). The reversal applied only to the valuation features of these cases.

Bingbam's Admr et al. v. Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Bingham's
Adm'r et al., 244 S.W. 781 at 789 and 790 (1922).
I"Especially Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board of Sup'r et al.,
178 Ky. 811, 200 S.W. 347 (1918), which the court cited with approval.
It is a commonplace that, aside from the fact that one party to a sale may
be a better bargainer than the other, there are variations in sale prices in a particular market because different equally well informed buyers and sellers place
varying estimates on the probable productivity of a particular property.
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market value is a sort of average 20 of prices fixed in imaginary
sales; or it is a range within which a free market transaction will
probably fall. This true-to-life conception is all but ruled out by
the Bingham case.
Secondly, the case precludes the consideration of the economically relevant evidence that blockage may result in a sale
price for a large amount of securities lower than the prevailing
market prices. This is exactly the problem involved in the Bingham and the Citizens Fidelity cases and requires no further comment.
In the third place, the Bingham case rules out the possibility
that the element of control, the right to select officers and employees and to fix their compensation and to determine dividend
policy, might involve an important cause of variation of fair
market value of corporate stock upward from quotations of current sales of minority shares. To a degree this issue was involved
in the Frankfort State National Bank case. At any rate, it is well
known in business circles that the right to control a small corporation is often extraordinarily valuable. For instance, a small, local
corporation may over a period of 10 or 20 years pay a dividend
equal to 20 or 30 per cent of the annual income available for
dividends. Meantime, the majority stockholder is accumulating
the remaining 70 or 80 per cent of the income for future distribution-or possibly with no intent to distribute-under such conditions the value of the majority share-owner's holdings is not even
remotely approximated by the sale price paid for a minority of
the shares. Again, the person who controls a corporation may well
pay to himself and to members of his family officers' salaries totally
out of line with the service rendered, thereby depressing income
and hence lowering the selling price of minority shares. In both
these sorts of cases, the tax administrator certainly should have a
right to estimate fair cash value at a figure well above the current
selling price of occasional small blocks of shares. Under the Bingham case doctrine, administrators were compelled to ignore such
considerations as to fair market value and fix tax assessments on
21
the basis of occasional sales.
o More likely to be a mode than a mean, but not invariably a modal figure.
'As a Kentucky tax administrator, the writer has confronted all these kinds
of embarrassment.
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There is a legal hiatus which has been occasioned by the Bingham case and which involved a special case of the second or third
difficulty just outlined. There is common sense persuasiveness
based on established legal grounds22 to the effect that the price at
which a personal representative can liquidate securities under certain conditions constitutes persuasive corroborative evidence of
fair market value for tax purposes. Essentially, the conditions are
(a) that, subsequent to the date as of which the valuation is made,
there is evidence that little or no change has occurred in market
conditions and (b) that the personal representative worked continuously toward a sale from substantially the date of the decedent's death until the transaction is consummated but without
such haste as might involve compulsion..2 3 In the estate of A, the
Kentucky Department of Revenue 24 found that the decedent
owned a large amount of stock, constituting a heavy proportion
of the total, in a corporation which he had long served as president.
Scattered sales immediately prior to death established the value
according to the Bingham case fiat. But counsel for the estate
undertook to prove a blockage differential and insisted that the
personal representative had liquidated the stock as promptly as
cautiousness permitted and that he had been compelled to accept
considerably less than the prices established by the earlier transactions. Meantime, there had been no considerable change in
prices in sales of minority holdings. Thus, in this case, as well as
in other cases, the Bingham case rule in the rigid form laid down
in the opinion squarely contradicted facts which other courts, as
well as professional appraisers, regard as relevant evidence of
25

value.
In the Citizens Fidelity case, handed down in 1953 as already
noted, the court, of course, could decide only the issues before it.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stewart's Estate, 153 Fed. 2d 17 and
cases there cited. Note also the cases cited in the Citizens Fidelity case, loc. cit.
supra note 14.
' Although the language of the text is related to death taxation, the same
kind of evidence is relevant and the same conditions are applicable in other tax
valuations. Cf. Martin and Estill, Valuation of Property: Economic and Legal
Standards, 38 Ky . L.J. 7 (1949).
' At the time, the present writer was Commissioner of Revenue.
Although the actual sale in the case of A's estate occurred subsequent to
the date as of which the valuation was required, there was plenty of expert
testimony as of the date of death to forecast the result which was subsequently
obtained. Technically, the subsequent transaction is merely in the nature of confirming evidence.
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In the opinion, however, Judge Combs went on to explain the
unanimous court's position as follows:
It will be seen from the foregoing resum6 that the
so-called "unit" rule adopted in the Bingham case is not in
harmony with the weight of authority and especially with
the later cases. Counsel for the Commission admit this and
also admit that in many cases complete reliance upon the
"unit" rule might result in prejudice to the state as well as
the taxpayer. If the taxpayer is prohibited from introducing
evidence to show that the stock exchange price of one share
of stock on a given day does not represent the "unit" value
of a block of similar stock in the hands of the taxpayer, so
is the commission. Obviously the rule must work both
ways....
Thus, it appears that the practical outcome of the recent litigation is to place the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the camp of
those persons, including perhaps all professional appraisers, who
insist that an administrative body does not err when it finds fair
market value "by weighing all relevant indicia of what the stocks
would bring at market."2 6 This outcome Will certainly eliminate
a great deal of discrimination from a relatively small number of
cases if the court follows the pronouncement unanimously laid
down:
Both the taxpayer and the Commission should
have the right to introduce extraneous evidence for the purpose of showing that the price for which stock is sold on a
stock exchange on a given date does not necessarily represent the unit value of similar stock held by a taxpayer on
that date. We do not undertake to say how much weight
the Commission should give to such evidence if it is introduced. Undoubtedly the stock exchange price would be
the best evidence of value in most cases. That would be
prima facie the value of the stock. But the Tax Commission,
whose duty it is to determine the actual fair cash value of
the stock in the manner prescribed by the Constitution,
should be permitted to hear competent evidence which
might rebut the presumption created by the stock exchange.
'Concluding
phrase in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Stewart's
Estate, 153 Fed. 2d 17. This point is fully developed in the light of the selfexecuting section 172 of the Kentucky Constitution in Martin and Estill, loc. cit.
supra note 23.

